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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43160 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-16365 
v.     ) 
     ) 
BRANDON MICHAEL CORRAL, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brandon Michael Corral pleaded guilty to one 
count of sexual exploitation of a child.  The district court imposed a sentence of thirty 
years, with seven years fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Corral asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence. 
Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 In July of 2014, the Idaho Attorney General’s office received “CyberTips” that 
Mr. Corral was uploading images, which included possible child pornography.  
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(Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.)1  Mr. Corral was a registered sex offender 
due to a 2010 case in which he was charged with attempting to receive child 
pornography.  (PSI, pp.2, 4.)  Mr. Corral was in the United States Coast Guard at the 
time of that charge, and he was ultimately discharged as a result of his conviction.  
(PSI, p.21.)   
After an investigation by the Boise Police Department, Mr. Corral was charged 
with four counts of sexual exploitation of a child.  (R., pp.42-44.)  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Mr. Corral agreed to plead guilty to one of the counts; he admitted that he 
had allowed others to download an image of child pornography that was in one of his 
accounts.  (Tr. 9/2/14, p.8, Ls.3-6, p.26, Ls.4-11; R., p.63.)  In exchange, the State 
agreed to dismiss the other charges.  (Tr. 9/2/14, p.8, Ls.6-7; R., p.63.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose 
a thirty-year sentence, with ten years fixed.  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.10, Ls.20-22.)  Mr. Corral’s 
counsel requested that the district court impose a sentence of ten years, with two years 
fixed, but retain jurisdiction so that Mr. Corral could participate in a Rider program.  
(Tr. 3/3/15, p.31, Ls.3-5.)  The district court imposed a sentence of thirty years, with 
seven years fixed.  (R. pp.63-65.)  Mr. Corral filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely 
from the district court’s judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.67-69.)  He also filed an I.C.R. 
35 motion, but the district court denied the motion.2  (R., pp.78, 82-83.)  
 
 
                                            
1 All references to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 416-page electronic 
document. 
2 Mr. Corral is not challenging the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of thirty years, with 
seven years fixed, following Mr. Corral’s plea of guilty to sexual exploitation of a child? 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Thirty Years, 
With Seven Years Fixed, Following Mr. Corral’s Plea Of Guilty To Sexual Exploitation Of 
A Child 
 
Despite the fact that Mr. Corral had only one prior offense, had served in the 
military for 7 years, and had no problems with substance abuse, the district court 
imposed an indeterminate sentence of 30 years—the maximum sentence allowed under 
the law—when Mr. Corral admitted to allowing others to download one image of child 
pornography from one of his accounts.  (PSI, pp.4-11; R., pp.63-65.)  Mr. Corral’s 
sentence of thirty years, with seven years fixed, is excessive because it is not 
necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.  When there is a claim that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, the appellate court will conduct an 
independent examination of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, 
the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.  State v. Reinke, 
103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of 
discretion standard.  State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000).  When a 
sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion.  
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).  Unless it appears that confinement was 
necessary “to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
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case,” a sentence is unreasonable.  State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 
1982).  Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, “under any reasonable view of the 
facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and 
therefore an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Corral’s sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  First, this was Mr. Corral’s first 
felony conviction.  (PSI, pp.4, 36.)  The district court found that this was Mr. Corral’s first 
felony because Mr. Corral was never incarcerated as a result of his conviction in the 
Coast Guard.  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.7, L.17 – p.8, L.4.)  Other than that one conviction and 
some minor traffic infractions in 2004 and 2005 when he was in high school, Mr. Corral 
had no prior offenses whatsoever.  (PSI, pp.4, 52.)  A defendant’s lack of a significant 
prior record is a well-recognized mitigating factor.  State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982). 
Additionally, Mr. Corral accepted responsibility for his actions.  In his statement 
for the PSI, he admitted that he didn’t seek help when he should have and said, “I am 
aware of what I’ve done, and I should be held accountable for my actions.”  (PSI, p.12.)  
Similarly, at his sentencing hearing, he said, “I am ashamed of what I have done.  And I 
do understand that what I have done has made the victims relive what has happened to 
them.”  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.32, Ls.3-6.)   
Mr. Corral is also amenable to treatment.  He regretted not reaching out for help 
when he first needed it and said, “I am open to any help, so this doesn’t become part of 
my life forever.  And you would not find anyone more willing to follow the rules of 
treatment or supervisors . . . .”  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.32, Ls.10-14.)  He has also said that he 
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wanted to “start a process of finding treatment to help myself control my problems.”  
(PSI, p.12.)  Idaho courts consider a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and 
amenability to treatment as mitigating information.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 
295-96 (1997). 
Idaho courts also recognize a defendant’s family support as mitigating 
information.  Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, 
had the support of his family and his employer).  Mr. Corral still enjoys the support of his 
family.  Mr. Corral’s mother wrote a letter on his behalf in which she indicated that he 
could live with them once he was released.  (PSI, pp.18-19.)  She said he had a good 
childhood and never had a problem with drugs or alcohol.  (PSI, pp.18-19.)  This was 
also evident from the PSI.  (PSI, p.11.)  His mother felt that when his wife divorced him 
and prevented him from seeing their daughter after his first conviction, Mr. Corral 
became “lost in depression.”  (PSI, p.19.)  Additionally, she stated that, after his 
discharge, he had “an extremely hard time adjusting to civilian life,” and he was “broke 
and thrown out of the only job that filled him with purpose and pride.”  (PSI, p.19.)  
Notably, Mr. Corral’s mother also wrote that Mr. Corral’s commander in the military 
“stood up for him” during his trial and said that he was “an exemplary person and 
worker.”  (PSI, p.19.)  She also pointed out that his commander “stated that porn was 
very prevalent in the military especially when they were out to sea for months on end” 
and without it, “they would have some major issues on the ships.”  (PSI, p.19.)      
Mr. Corral admitted that he started viewing pornography when he was only ten 
years old, and he acknowledged that he would look at it on “long patrols with the 
U.S.C.G.” where it was obviously accepted.  (PSI, pp.6, 10.)  Unfortunately, that pattern 
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ultimately led to illegal acts because, “[a]s time went on,” Mr. Corral said he would look 
at “more dangerous types of porn” and use it as a replacement for intimacy.  (PSI, p.3.)  
However, as the district court acknowledged, he passed a polygraph, which showed 
that he never touched a child.  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.36, L.24 – p.37, L.2.)   
Therefore, it is clear that, from a young age, Mr. Corral started developing a 
problem for which he needed treatment, but he never received that treatment.  As his 
counsel pointed out at the sentencing hearing, the Coast Guard never offered him 
treatment, and thus “he has never had the opportunity to try to fix his problem.”  
(Tr. 3/3/15, p.30, Ls.20-21.)  There is no question that this is a serious offense, but the 
record makes it clear that Mr. Corral was an otherwise productive and upstanding 
citizen who developed a problem for which he needed treatment.  Mr. Corral’s LSI score 
was a 17, which placed him in the moderate risk category.  (PSI, pp.12-13.)  However, 
instead of giving him a chance to pursue treatment on a Rider program, and despite all 
the mitigating information he presented, the district court sentenced him to the 
maximum indeterminate sentence allowed.  As such, even if he is highly successful in 
treatment, he will remain under state supervision until he is 58 years old and almost at 
the end of his prime working years.  This will not only handicap Mr. Corral’s ability to 
make a living but will also place a significant financial burden on the State of Idaho until 
2045.  A sentence of this duration, with no prior documented treatment is entirely 
unreasonable. 
Indeed, the PSI investigator included “sentencing database information” that 
showed the sentences of 16 other offenders who were convicted of the same charge as 
Mr. Corral.  (PSI, p.14.)  That database showed that 7 of those offenders “were 
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sentenced to probation with the minimum median sentence of 1 year and the maximum 
median sentence of 10 years.  9 offenders were sentenced to Retained Jurisdiction with 
the minimum median sentence of 2 years and the maximum median sentence of 10 
years.”  (PSI, p.14.)  Further, Mr. Corral’s counsel pointed out that this database 
included people with alcohol and drug problems.  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.27, Ls.23-25.)  
Mr. Corral has no such problems.  Mr. Corral’s counsel also reiterated to the district 
court that Mr. Coral had “a prior functioning long-term relationship” as well as “prosocial 
people in his support network,” a “positive attitude towards supervision” and “no history 
of violence.”  (Tr. 3/3/15, p.28, Ls.15-23.)  Nevertheless, the district court imposed a 30-
year sentence.   
In light of all the mitigating information here, Mr. Corral’s sentence was excessive 
because it was not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing outlined in Toohill.  If 
Mr. Corral was able to participate in a Rider followed by probation, society would be 
protected because if he made any mistakes, the district court could immediately execute 
his underlying sentence.  This would also serve as a strong deterrent.  More 
importantly, it would give Mr. Corral his first chance to engage in treatment and 
rehabilitation.  This is a man who served this country in the armed forces for almost 
seven years.  (PSI, p.9.)  He deserves a chance at meaningful treatment now that his 
problem has been brought to light, and he is not in denial.  He does not deserve to be 
incarcerated for an extended term unless it becomes clear that treatment would not be 
effective.  Given the facts of this case, Mr. Corral’s extended sentence was certainly not 
necessary and was therefore unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Corral respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  In particular, he requests that this Court reduce his indeterminate 
sentence.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 20th day of November, 2015. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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